The Damascus-SDF agreement two months on: Fragile progress or delayed collapse?

On March 10, 2025, Ahmed al-Sharaa, the president of Syria, and Mazloum Abdi, the commander-in-chief of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), signed a historic agreement, ending a long-running divide between Damascus and the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES). The agreement stipulated the integration of SDF military and civilian structures into Syrian state institutions, constitutionally guaranteed rights for all groups, established a comprehensive cease-fire, and unified efforts to fight the remnants of Bashar al-Assad’s regime.

The agreement was welcomed by many as a significant step toward national unity, amid cautious international support. Even Turkey, historically opposed to the SDF, expressed cautious optimism, as the agreement, if implemented, would help stabilize Syria, even as Ankara reiterated its demands for the disarmament of the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), a key component of the SDF.

Now, two months after the agreement was signed, how far has it progressed, and what are the main obstacles and disputes between the parties during this transitional phase?

Initial indicators: Cautious calm and gradual steps

There were positive signs in the first weeks suggesting that both sides had begun to gradually implement some aspects of the deal. On the ground, a cautious calm prevailed on most fronts, with both parties adhering to the agreed cease-fire, paving the way for confidence-building measures. The predominantly Kurdish neighborhoods of Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh in Aleppo, previously isolated and under the control of local SDF-affiliated forces, began to be reintegrated. According to a government source familiar with the negotiations, a local agreement there gradually restored state authority, with Syrian internal security forces deploying and most SDF fighters withdrawing in an orderly fashion, reflecting the SDF’s goodwill and the government’s commitment to protecting residents as well as ensuring freedom of movement and supply after years of isolation.

The joint central committees emerging from the March agreement have also begun their preparatory work, pending the formation of security and military committees to discuss how to integrate the SDF into the structure of the Syrian army and security services. Additionally, service committees are expected to be formed to manage local administrative affairs in the northeast.

According to a government source, significant progress has been made in forming the higher military and security committees on the government’s side. Technical teams from both parties have met over the past weeks to develop a preliminary vision for a joint command structure and the distribution of responsibilities. According to the source, “There is an understanding on broad outlines for incorporating SDF fighters into Syrian army units, while preserving the distinct nature of certain formations, such as those specializing in counterterrorism.” He also confirms that the committees from both sides are coordinating to swiftly resolve any security issues and prevent them from escalating.

These initial steps suggest both Damascus and the SDF are serious about moving forward with implementing the agreement, although they recognize that the road ahead will not be easy.

Tishreen Dam, detainees, and security: Early tests of trust

The case of the Tishreen Dam in eastern Aleppo, a critical piece of infrastructure that provides water and power to millions of people in the region, provides an example of how challenging it will be to implement the agreement at the desired pace. While the dam was supposed to be swiftly handed over as a sovereign facility, a government source confirms that there was “a clear delay,” attributing it to “procrastination on the part of the SDF.” Technical teams from the Ministry of Water Resources were unable to begin their work as DAANES officials raised security-related concerns, insisting on guarantees for the technicians’ safety amid fears that the dam could be targeted by opponents of the agreement.

SDF sources say there was no intention to obstruct the handover, but negotiations had to be held to work out a protocol for electricity distribution and prevent an administrative vacuum. Hamdan al-Abed, an Arab politician from Raqqa who serves as the deputy co-president of DAANES, described the dam as “a sensitive issue that requires high-level coordination,” adding that the delay stems from a commitment to ensuring stability while affirming there is “genuine will” to implement the agreement.

The dam has been the site of more than three months of clashes between the SDF and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army as well as civilian popular resistance. On May 5, DAANES announced that the military operations and civilian sit-ins had ended, but control of the Tishreen Dam has not yet been handed over to the government. According to a member of the government’s negotiating team, the latest talks — held on May 5 at the al-Omar oil field — confirmed that the issue remains unresolved. The government maintains that the dam is a sovereign public utility that should fall under the Ministry of Energy, with access granted to its engineers. The SDF, however, insists on keeping security forces loyal to DAANES in place to guard the facility, and demands that dam staff remain under its administrative authority. According to the same source, the SDF leadership believes that handing the dam over to Damascus would lead to the encirclement of Ayn al-Arab (Kobani), which it categorically rejects. Negotiations over this issue have caused a broader deadlock, with all joint committees now effectively on hold pending a breakthrough.

As for the issue of detainees held by the SDF and the Syrian government, an initial batch has been released from both sides and an SDF source confirms a preliminary understanding to clear out the detention facilities. However, the government accuses DAANES of delays in submitting the required lists of detainees, which is hindering progress.

On the security front, the SDF is accused of continuing to dig tunnels and fortify positions despite the cease-fire agreement — practices that a government source described as “unacceptable behaviors” that undermine trust and raise suspicions.

The constitution and decentralization: Kurdish aspirations and Damascus’ red lines

The March agreement also covers political and administrative issues that are just as important as the military ones. The Syrian state pledged to guarantee the constitutional rights of the Kurdish population and to recognize its distinctiveness within the framework of national unity. However, the real challenge lies in the details, particularly on the form of decentralized governance and the drafting of a new or interim constitution.

Following the March agreement, DAANES officials convened an intra-Kurdish conference at the end of April in Qamishli, bringing together various Kurdish factions — including those previously opposed to the Autonomous Administration — in an effort to unify their positions. This intra-Kurdish conference called for a “decentralized democratic” state in Syria and constitutional guarantees on issues like Kurdish rights. The conference generated considerable criticism and pushback from Damascus, specifically over the issue of decentralization.

Although Kurdish demands often center on federalism and the establishment of a Kurdish region within a federal state, DAANES says that this is the position of the Kurdish political parties, while it advocates for administrative decentralization. Hamdan al-Abed clarified that administrative decentralization is “at the core of what we’ve been demanding for years,” and that the agreement with Damascus “will not be sustainable unless a form of democratic local governance is enshrined in the upcoming constitution.” He added: “We are not seeking division or secession — we have repeatedly affirmed Syria’s unity — but we want to ensure that our regions have the authority to manage their own affairs within the framework of the state. This would allow us to preserve the democratic gains achieved by the Autonomous Administration during the fight against ISIS and in managing services, while ensuring fair representation for all components.”

The DAANES leadership believes that integrating their political experience into Syria’s new system of governance would benefit the country as a whole. However, following the intra-Kurdish conference, the Syrian presidency released a statement affirming its commitment to the agreement with the SDF while rejecting calls for federalism and what it described as “separatist practices” that threaten Syria’s unity. The government stressed its rejection of monopolizing decision-making or altering the demographic identity of any region, calling on the SDF to adhere to the agreement and prioritize national interests as well as reaffirming that the rights of all groups will be protected within a unified state. This marked the first escalation by the government against the SDF since the agreement was signed, laying out clear red lines.

The SDF recognizes that it may be difficult to convince other Syrian factions of the merits of decentralization, as there are longstanding fears in Damascus that it could weaken the capital’s authority. The drafting of the constitution is expected to be the main arena for debate, defining the level of decentralization, the role of regional administrations, and ensuring that Syria neither returns to centralized authoritarianism nor fractures into parallel entities that threaten state unity.

Regional dynamics are further complicating matters. While Turkey has cautiously welcomed the Kurdish-Damascus rapprochement, it is closely monitoring any discourse around Kurdish self-rule, which it may perceive as an extension of separatist ambitions near its borders. As a result, Damascus and the SDF leadership will have to carefully balance their constituencies' aspirations for local governance with concerns among the broader public and regional powers over Syria’s unity and sovereignty.

Inside the SDF: Divided loyalties and weak command

One of the more sensitive internal issues is the control exerted by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) over decision-making within the SDF. Ankara has long accused the SDF leadership of being subordinate to cadres from the Qandil Mountains, the PKK’s headquarters. A senior Arab SDF figure from Deir ez-Zor openly acknowledged “that PKK cadres present in northeastern Syria have had significant influence over decision-making in the SDF over the past years. These individuals operate with their own agenda tied to their long-standing conflict with Turkey.”

However, he noted that the balance has shifted following recent developments, notably the February call by Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned founder of the PKK, for the group to disarm and dissolve itself. “Abdullah Öcalan’s supportive stance on disarmament and dissolving the party, coupled with Turkey’s openness to engaging with [Syrian President] Sharaa, has placed PKK leaders in a new reality — one that pushed them to approve a reconciliation approach in Syria,” he explained.

Still, sensitivities persist. Some hardline PKK elements fear that the agreement could spell the end of their influence in Syria, and they may therefore attempt to delay certain steps until they receive guarantees of protection for their cadres.

The recent incident at the Tishreen Dam illustrates this tension. When Mazloum Abdi visited the dam and declared an end to protests and resistance, calling for its neutrality, PKK fighters reportedly rejected the move. According to SDF sources, they insisted on remaining mobilized at the dam and refused to withdraw their fighters. Meanwhile, the Revolutionary Youth (al-Shabiba al-Thawriyya) continued to carry out recruitment drives, detentions, and tunnel digging. The situation was eventually resolved in early May, with the SDF and DAANES announcing the end of 100 days of military resistance and protest on May 5, although control of the dam has not yet been handed over.

By contrast, Arab leaders within the SDF, along with many local Kurdish leaders, appear more eager to hasten the agreement’s success. They believe it is the best path to spare their regions further bloodshed or the risk of a new Turkish incursion. They argue that integration into the state would provide both Kurdish and Arab communities with stronger representation in Syria’s future. However, they emphasize that the Arab component of the SDF must not be marginalized in the integration process.

The Arab source stated, “Arabs make up a large portion of the SDF and the population in its areas, and they have the right to be genuine partners in the upcoming arrangements.” He revealed that discussions are under way regarding the proportional representation of Arabs and Kurds in the expanded local councils set to be formed as well as in the leadership of the new military formations that will include SDF units. From his perspective, what is needed is “to ensure genuine balance so that no party feels aggrieved or that the process is favoring one group over another.”

In short, unity of decision-making within the SDF remains a work in progress. Its leadership must maintain internal cohesion by reassuring all components — Kurdish and Arab alike — that their interests and identities will be protected in the new Syria. The success of this effort will largely determine the pace at which the agreement is implemented going forward.

Silent anger and a missing voice: The legitimacy test and the marginalization of civil society

While the Autonomous Administration presents itself as an inclusive democratic project representing all parts of society, in recent months there has been growing discontent in Syria’s Jazira region, especially among Arab tribes and some Kurdish families. Human rights reports and local sources point to the continued enforcement of mandatory conscription, including cases involving minors — both boys and girls — without parental consent, sparking widespread outrage. For example, documented cases of child recruitment by the Revolutionary Youth have been reported by organizations such as the Syrian Human Rights Committee and local media sources.

There are also recurring complaints of arbitrary arrests, increased security restrictions on activists and dissenters, and the monopolization of economic resources — such as oil and wheat — by DAANES, along with the imposition of unlawful fees on movement and trade. In recent weeks, there has been a surge in arrests targeting Sunni Arab men — many of them former SDF members — accused of attempting to defect. Local sources report dozens of such cases within a span of just three to four weeks. These developments have further strained relations between the SDF and Arab communities in the region, fueling perceptions of political exclusion and mistrust.

These abuses are eroding the SDF’s popular support and fueling resentment among segments of the population who increasingly look to the Syrian state to take on a greater role in managing local affairs, especially as the region’s political prospects appear stagnant. The situation raises critical questions about the SDF’s ability to transition from a military-security entity into a representative civilian structure within the framework of the Syrian state, unless it reconsiders its internal security and social policies.

Despite all this, residents in areas under SDF control continue to hope for a swift implementation of the March agreement and the establishment of a stable security situation that could open the door to improved economic and living conditions. The region had long suffered from neglect under the Assad regime and never had a chance to recover during SDF rule, which many accuse of exploiting local resources for its benefit. Both Arabs and Kurds seek stability and the opportunity to press the government to pursue real development programs for their region.

Amid these major transformations, the voice of civil society in northeastern Syria is absent from the negotiating table. Tribal groups, local elites, and civil society activists remain marginalized — both by the SDF and the Syrian state. Without their genuine representation in post-agreement arrangements, the legitimacy of the process remains in question. Community participation is no less important than military arrangements — it is, in fact, the only guarantee of lasting stability.

Turkey and the United States: Conditional support and cautious balancing

The Damascus-SDF agreement cannot be fully understood without addressing the role of Turkey, a key actor in northern Syria. Ankara, which has engaged in indirect conflict with the SDF for years, welcomed the March agreement and considered it a potential step toward stability — but tied its support to clear conditions. In a formal statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey expressed conditional support, emphasizing its rejection of any political or military empowerment of groups affiliated with the PKK within Syria, viewing this as a threat to the country’s unity. The statement asserted that “combating terrorism and separatism is a core responsibility of the Syrian administration,” demanded the dismantling of these organizations and the prevention of their continued influence, and reaffirmed Turkey’s openness to cooperation with Damascus based on its own security assessments. A regional meeting in Amman also produced an agreement to establish a joint counterterrorism center.

In response, Damascus provided reassurances that military integration would involve only Syrian nationals, while non-Syrian PKK elements would need to depart or normalize their status. The two sides also discussed the establishment of a joint border-monitoring mechanism. Despite this apparent rapprochement, DAANES remains wary that Turkish-Syrian convergence could result in a backroom deal at its expense — especially as Turkish drone strikes continue intermittently. Hamdan al-Abed warned that “ongoing Turkish threats hinder implementation and sow doubt,” calling on Ankara to halt any actions that might inflame tensions. An Arab SDF leader expressed similar concerns about potential Turkish-Syrian security coordination targeting DAANES officials, stressing, “The safety of those who fought ISIS should not become a bargaining chip in any understanding.”

In this context, Öcalan’s initiative to dissolve the PKK offered a potential political shift that could help the SDF bolster its legitimacy and further distinguish itself from the PKK. However, Öcalan’s influence over the hardline leadership in Qandil is increasingly in doubt, particularly after years of isolation and the evolution of PKK leadership structures into more rigid military formations.

Ultimately, Turkey’s position remains a decisive factor: It could contribute to stability in the north if it responds positively to the new reality, or it could obstruct the agreement if it feels its core interests are not being met. Time will tell how things play out, particularly when it comes to sensitive issues like the withdrawal of PKK cadres and the formation of a new border security architecture.

As for the United States, it welcomed the agreement when it was signed and, just last month, reiterated its conditions for normalization with Damascus — chief among them being counterterrorism, the expulsion of foreign fighters, and the reduction of Iranian influence. Notably, Washington made no direct reference to the SDF, signaling a cautious approach that monitors regional balances. The Americans recently withdrew from their bases in Deir ez-Zor, paving the way for a meeting on May 5 between SDF and Syrian government figures to discuss a host of issues, including a pathway for the region’s integration into government control. For now, Washington appears to be seeking a middle path: maintaining its traditional support for the SDF while exploring potential security coordination with Damascus, so long as the latter commits to limiting Iranian influence and stabilizing the northeast. In this context, the US may become a flexible lever to encourage the SDF to move forward with the agreement — preserving American interests without direct engagement.

Future scenarios and challenges of the transitional phase

Amid these complex and interconnected dynamics, the Damascus-SDF agreement stands at a critical crossroads — one that will determine whether it becomes a historic milestone paving the way for Syria’s reunification, or collapses under the weight of its challenges.

The positive scenario envisions a gradual implementation of the agreement’s terms despite existing obstacles. This would involve the handover of the Tishreen Dam — a process that remains stalled due to unresolved technical and security arrangements — followed by the resolution of detainee and tunnel-related issues through the building of mutual trust, and the continued operation of joint committees at a satisfactory pace. This would eventually culminate in the full integration of SDF forces into the Syrian army by year’s end — the target date for the agreement’s implementation.

Under this path, SDF fighters would be gradually absorbed, with a government source suggesting they would be incorporated within a specially designated division of limited size operating in eastern Syria, deployed alongside regular army units. Additionally, a government-affiliated public security force would be established to share responsibility for maintaining order with the Asayish forces, which would come under the Syrian Ministry of Interior.

Political demands would also be addressed through agreements that guarantee Kurdish and DAANES rights within a unified Syrian state. This could lead to greater public engagement with transitional governance structures, bolstered by increased confidence in the process. In such a scenario, Turkey would likely achieve its primary objective — curbing PKK influence — which could pave the way for lasting calm along the Turkish-Syrian border.

However, this outcome would require considerable flexibility from all sides, prioritizing Syrian national interests over narrow agendas. It would also demand robust international backing — from the US, Europe, and other stakeholders — to ensure sustained commitment, provide mediation, and offer compensation to parties experiencing relative losses.

By contrast, a negative scenario looms if underlying tensions erupt. Continued delays in implementation — such as ongoing delays in handing over the Tishreen Dam or a flare-up caused by an unresolved security incident — could undermine trust and reignite mutual accusations. External factors, such as heightened tensions with Turkey, could further destabilize the situation. For example, if Ankara were to act on its threats and launch a new military operation under the pretext of coalition withdrawals and delays in dismantling the YPG, this could place the SDF in a precarious position — potentially prompting it to suspend cooperation with Damascus.

These divergent paths highlight the fragility of the transitional phase and the need for careful navigation, inclusive dialogue, and strong mediation to prevent a collapse of the process and to lay the groundwork for sustainable peace in northeastern Syria.

The greatest danger: Internal fragmentation and lessons from other conflicts

The gravest threat to the Damascus-SDF agreement lies in potential internal divisions — whether within the SDF’s own ranks or inside Syria’s transitional state institutions. Should a radical faction within the SDF reject the integration process and decide to resume armed activity independently, or if Assad loyalists move to support historically aligned elements within the PKK in a bid to sabotage the agreement, it could plunge all parties into a renewed conflict that jeopardizes the fragile gains made thus far.

Moreover, the risk of ISIS exploiting any security vacuum or renewed tensions cannot be dismissed. Such a development could lead to fresh attacks, heightening mistrust among the already cautious stakeholders and potentially derailing the fragile consensus.

The Damascus-SDF agreement can be better understood in light of similar experiences with integrating armed entities into central state structures elsewhere. In Iraq, for example, the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) were formally integrated into the national army in 2016. However, divided loyalties and political rivalries have sustained a dual security structure that continues to complicate state sovereignty. In Sudan, the 2005 Naivasha Agreement ended decades of war between Khartoum and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement through a power- and resource-sharing framework. But the deal ultimately collapsed, leading to South Sudan’s secession due to deep ethnic divisions and persistent mistrust. Similarly, the 1995 Dayton Agreement brought an end to the Bosnian civil war by creating a fragile federal system under international supervision. While it halted open conflict, it effectively froze the underlying tensions and left behind a fragmented political structure.

These cases share certain similarities with Syria: the political and military identities of the parties involved are complex, and long-term success hinges on the presence of genuine political will, sustainable implementation guarantees, and a regional environment where key players like Turkey, Iran, and Gulf states do not act as spoilers.

Most likely, the outcome will fall somewhere between the optimistic and pessimistic scenarios. Despite the challenges, there is a rare convergence of local and regional interests in giving the process a chance. None of the key actors stands to benefit from the deal’s collapse: not Damascus, which is banking on national reunification and solidifying its legitimacy; not the Autonomous Administration, which recognizes that alternative paths are far riskier; and not even Ankara or Washington, both of which see the deal — albeit for different reasons — as a workable exit from a long-standing impasse.

Accordingly, the process is expected to proceed through slow, detail-driven negotiations. Timelines may be missed and certain milestones delayed, but there will likely be sustained efforts to keep communication channels open and to avoid a complete breakdown of dialogue.

A delicate path forward: Between hope and distrust

Delays beyond the end-of-year deadline for full implementation of the Damascus-SDF agreement now seem likely. However, provisional compromises could keep the situation under control — particularly if mirrored by other localized agreements, such as those recently reached with Druze-majority towns like Sahnaya and Jaramana. In these areas, immediate arms handovers and the reassertion of state authority have set a precedent for de-escalation and trust-building.

Step-by-step confidence-building measures between Damascus and the SDF remain a viable path forward. Each small success — such as the progress in Aleppo — bolsters the potential for broader progress. Yet this fragile momentum hinges on the sustained support of key international and regional powers. The United States, Turkey, Arab countries, and France all have a role to play in applying pressure and providing incentives to accelerate implementation.

The coming weeks will be critical in shaping the contours of a new Syria. For now, Syrians are watching with cautious optimism, wondering whether the historic March agreement will help bring about genuine national reconciliation or come undone due to lingering mistrust, still raw after a decade of bloody conflict.

Ultimately, the success of the March agreement depends not only on the implementation of its terms, but on the ability of both sides to overcome mutual suspicions, respond to domestic and international pressures, and transform political consensus into a broad-based social contract. The road ahead is long, but the opportunity remains — if it is not squandered.

 

Samer al-Ahmed is a Syrian journalist and researcher who focuses on developments in northeastern Syria. He holds a master’s degree in international relations and has written multiple reports and research papers for Arab and international centers. You can follow him on Twitter @sameralahmadnq.

Photo by MOHAMAD DABOUL/Middle East Images/AFP via Getty Images